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An unresolved question is how the reported clarity of degraded speech is enhanced when listeners have
prior knowledge of speech content. One account of this phenomenon proposes top-down modulation of
early acoustic processing by higher-level linguistic knowledge. Alternative, strictly bottom-up accounts
argue that acoustic information and higher-level knowledge are combined at a late decision stage without
modulating early acoustic processing. Here we tested top-down and bottom-up accounts using written
text to manipulate listeners’ knowledge of speech content. The effect of written text on the reported
clarity of noise-vocoded speech was most pronounced when text was presented before (rather than after)
speech (Experiment 1). Fine-grained manipulation of the onset asynchrony between text and speech
revealed that this effect declined when text was presented more than 120 ms after speech onset
(Experiment 2). Finally, the influence of written text was found to arise from phonological (rather than
lexical) correspondence between text and speech (Experiment 3). These results suggest that prior
knowledge effects are time-limited by the duration of auditory echoic memory for degraded speech,
consistent with top-down modulation of early acoustic processing by linguistic knowledge.
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An enduring puzzle is how we understand speech despite sen-
sory information that is often ambiguous or degraded. Whether
listening to a speaker with a foreign accent or in a noisy room, we
recognize spoken language with accuracy that outperforms exist-
ing computer recognition systems. One explanation for this con-
siderable feat is that listeners are highly adept at exploiting prior
knowledge of the environment to aid speech perception.
Prior knowledge from a variety of sources facilitates speech per-
ception in everyday listening. Previous studies have shown that lip
movements, which typically precede arriving speech signals by150
ms (Chandrasekaran, Trubanova, Stillittano, Caplier, & Ghazanfar,
2009), improve speech intelligibility in noise (Ma, Zhou, Ross, Foxe,
& Parra, 2009; Ross, Saint-Amour, Leavitt, Javitt, & Foxe, 2007;
Sumby, 1954). Another strong source of prior knowledge is the
linguistic context in which an utterance is spoken. Listeners are
quicker to identify phonemes located at the ends of words rather than
nonwords (Frauenfelder, Segui, & Dijkstra, 1990). For sentences
presented in noise, word report is more accurate when the sentences
are syntactically and semantically constrained (Boothroyd &
Nittrouer, 1988; Kalikow, 1977; Miller & Isard, 1963).
Although the influence of prior knowledge on speech perception
is widely acknowledged, there is a longstanding debate about the
underlying mechanism. Much of this controversy has centered on
one particular effect of prior knowledge: the influence of lexical
context on phonological judgments in phonetic categorization and
phoneme monitoring tasks (e.g., Frauenfelder et al., 1990; Ganong,
1980; Warren, 1970). One explanation for this phenomenon is that
it reflects top-down modulation of phonological processing by
higher-level lexical knowledge (McClelland & Elman, 1986; Mc-
Clelland, Mirman, & Holt, 2006). There are alternative accounts,
however, that do not invoke top-down processing. According to
these strictly bottom-up accounts, lexical information is combined
with phonological information only at a late decision stage where
the phonological judgment is formed (Massaro, 1989; Norris,
McQueen, & Cutler, 2000).
In the current study, we used a novel experimental paradigm to
assess top-down and bottom-up accounts of prior knowledge ef-
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fects on speech perception. Listeners’ prior knowledge was ma-
nipulated by presenting written text before acoustically degraded
spoken words. Previous studies have shown that this produces a
striking effect on the reported clarity of speech (Sohoglu, Peelle,
Carlyon, & Davis, 2012; Wild, Davis, & Johnsrude, 2012; see also
Mitterer & McQueen, 2009) that some authors have interpreted as
arising from a decision process (Frost, Repp, & Katz, 1988). This
is because written text was found to modulate signal detection bias rather
than perceptual sensitivity. However, modeling work has shown
that signal detection theory cannot distinguish between bottom-up
and top-down accounts of speech perception (Norris, 1995; Norris
et al., 2000). Hence, an effect of written text on signal detection
bias could arise at a late decision stage in a bottom-up fashion or
at an early sensory level in a top-down manner. In the current
study, we used written text to manipulate both when higher-level
knowledge becomes available to listeners and the degree of cor-
respondence between prior knowledge and speech input. We will
argue that these manipulations more accurately distinguish be-
tween top-down and bottom-up accounts.
In the experiments described below, speech was degraded using
a noise-vocoding procedure, which removes its temporal and spec-
tral fine structure while preserving low-frequency temporal infor-
mation (Shannon, Zeng, Kamath, Wygonski, & Ekelid, 1995).
Vocoded speech has been a popular stimulus with which to study
speech perception because the amount of sensory detail (both
spectral and temporal) can be carefully controlled to explore the
low-level acoustic factors contributing to speech intelligibility
(e.g., Deeks & Carlyon, 2004; Loizou, Dorman, & Tu, 1999;
Roberts, Summers, & Bailey, 2011; Rosen, Faulkner, & Wilkin-
son, 1999; Whitmal, Poissant, Freyman, & Helfer, 2007; Xu,
Thompson, & Pfingst, 2005). Furthermore, vocoded speech is
widely believed to approximate the information available to deaf-
ened individuals who have a cochlear implant (see Shannon et al.,
1995). Hence, findings from studies employing vocoded speech
not only have implications for understanding the cognitive pro-
cesses subserving speech perception in normal hearing individuals,
but also in the hearing impaired.
When written text is presented before vocoded speech, listeners
report that the amount of acoustic degradation is reduced (Wild et
al., 2012; see also Goldinger, Kleider, & Shelley, 1999; Jacoby,
Allan, Collins, & Larwill, 1988). This suggests that written text
modifies listeners’ judgments about the low-level acoustic charac-
teristics of speech. In analogy to the top-down and bottom-up
explanations of lexical effects on phonological judgments, there
are two mechanisms that could enable prior knowledge from
written text to modulate listeners’ judgments about the perceived
clarity of vocoded speech. One possibility is that abstract (lexical
or phonological) knowledge obtained from text has the effect of
modulating early acoustic processing, giving rise to enhanced
perceptual clarity (top-down account, see Figure 1a). Alterna-
tively, information from written and spoken sources could be
combined at a late decision stage, where the clarity judgment is
formed, without modulating early acoustic processing (bottom-up
account, see Figure 1b). We now describe the three experiments
we have conducted to test these competing accounts of written text
effects.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 introduces the paradigm that we used to assess the
impact of prior knowledge from written text on the perception of
vocoded speech. Listeners were presented with vocoded spoken
words that varied in the amount of sensory detail, and were asked
to rate the perceived clarity of speech. Listeners’ prior knowledge
of speech content was manipulated by presenting matching, mis-
matching, or neutral text before each spoken word. We first
characterized the effect of manipulating prior knowledge by asking
whether the rated clarity of vocoded speech can be modified not
Figure 1. Two competing accounts of how prior lexical or phonological knowledge from written text
influences decisions about perceived (acoustic) clarity of vocoded speech. Gray colored boxes indicate the
representations that are that potentially modified by written text in each account. A) Top-down account: prior
knowledge influences early acoustic processing prior to the decision stage (as in McClelland & Elman, 1986).
B) Bottom-up account: prior knowledge and acoustic information are combined at a late decision stage without
modulating early acoustic processing (as in Norris et al., 2000).
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only by the amount of sensory detail conveyed by the vocoder, but
also by written text. We assessed both positive and negative effects
of prior knowledge on the rated clarity of speech by comparing
clarity ratings obtained from matching and mismatching contexts
with those from the neutral condition.
One situation that can potentially distinguish between top-down
and bottom-up accounts is when knowledge of speech content
comes not before but after speech has been heard. This is because
there is good evidence that memory for low-level acoustic infor-
mation (auditory echoic memory) has a limited duration. Although
estimates of the duration of echoic memory vary depending on the
paradigm used (e.g., Crowder & Morton, 1969; Massaro, 1970,
1974; Sams, Hari, Rif & Knuutila, 1993), a consensus has emerged
on an early auditory store that preserves unanalyzed acoustic
information for around 200–300 ms (see Massaro, 1972; Cowan,
1984; Loveless, Levänen, Jousmäki, Sams, & Hari, 1996).1 In
contrast, nonsensory information in working memory is widely
believed to have a much longer duration (several seconds or
longer). It therefore follows that if effects of prior knowledge are
attributable to a top-down component that modulates acoustic
processing, written text will be less effective in influencing speech
perception when presented after the 200300 ms duration of
auditory echoic memory. On the other hand, if effects of prior
knowledge arise from a strictly bottom-up mechanism, the influ-
ence of written text should be apparent even when presented
several seconds after speech. This is because the critical stage of
processing in such an account is at the decision stage (where
speech information and higher-level knowledge converges). Here,
information has been abstracted from the sensory input and hence
can be maintained without decay in working memory over several
seconds.
To test these two accounts, the critical manipulation in Exper-
iment 1 involved varying the timing of written text and speech so
that on some trials text was presented 800 ms before speech onset
(the before condition) and on other trials text was presented 800
ms after speech onset (the after condition). We used monosyllabic
spoken words (lasting around 600 ms) in order for acoustic rep-
resentations of speech to decay by the time of text presentation in
the after condition. As described above, this should reduce the
influence of text only if attributable to a top-down component.
Materials and Methods
Participants. Nineteen participants were tested after being
informed of the study’s procedure, which was approved by the
Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee. All were na-
tive speakers of English, aged between 18 and 40 years and
reported no history of hearing impairment or neurological disease.
Stimuli and procedure. A total of 360 monosyllabic words
were presented in spoken or written format. The spoken words
were 16-bit, 44.1 kHz recordings of a male speaker of southern
British English and their duration ranged from 372 to 903 ms
(M  600, SD  83).
Written text was presented 800 ms before or after the onset of
each spoken word (see Figure 2). Written text contained a word
that was the same (matching) or different (mismatching) to the
spoken word, or a string of x characters (neutral). Written words
for the mismatching condition were obtained by permuting the
word list for their spoken form. As a result, each written word in
the mismatching condition was also presented as a spoken word
and vice versa. Mean string length was equated across conditions.
Written text was composed of black lowercase characters pre-
sented for 200 ms on a gray background.
The amount of sensory detail in speech was varied using a
noise-vocoding procedure (Shannon et al., 1995), which superim-
poses the temporal envelope from separate frequency regions in
the speech signal onto corresponding frequency regions of white
noise. This allows parametric variation of spectral detail, with
increasing numbers of channels associated with increasing percep-
tual clarity. Vocoding was performed using a custom Matlab
(MathWorks Inc.) script, using 1, 2, 4, 8, or 16 spectral channels
logarithmically spaced between 70 and 5,000 Hz. Envelope signals
in each channel were extracted using half-wave rectification and
smoothing with a second-order low-pass filter with a cut-off fre-
quency of 30 Hz. The overall RMS amplitude was adjusted to be
the same across all audio files. Pilot data showed that mean word
identification accuracy (across participants) for speech with 2, 4
1 These authors propose an additional, longer form of auditory storage
lasting several seconds. However, the evidence to date suggests that this
longer form of auditory storage contains more abstract representations of
sound features and sequences and is better described as a form of working
(rather than sensory) memory (see Massaro, 1972; Cowan, 1984).
Figure 2. Stimulus characteristics in Experiment 1. A) Example written-
spoken word pairs used for matching, mismatching, and neutral conditions.
B) Order of events in the before condition. C) Order of events in the after
condition.
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and 8 channels of sensory detail is 3.41% (SD  1.93), 17.05%
(SD  1.98) and 68.18% (SD  2.77), respectively. Identification
accuracy for 1 channel and 16 channel speech was not tested
because it is known from previous studies that for open-set assess-
ment of word recognition, speech with these amounts of sensory
detail are entirely unintelligible and perfectly intelligible, respec-
tively (e.g., Obleser, Eisner, & Kotz, 2008; Sheldon, Pichora-
Fuller, & Schneider, 2008a).
Manipulations of written text timing (before/after), congruency
(matching/mismatching/neutral) and speech sensory detail (1/2/4/
8/16 channels) were fully crossed, resulting in a 2  3  5
factorial design with 12 trials in each condition. Trials were
randomly ordered during each of two presentation blocks of 180
trials. The words assigned to each sensory detail and congruency
condition were randomized over participants. Given that words
were randomly assigned to each participant, we only report the
outcome of standard analyses by participants because analyses by
items are unnecessary with randomized or counterbalanced de-
signs (Raaijmakers, Schrijnemakers, & Gremmen, 1999).
Stimulus delivery was controlled with E-Prime 2.0 software
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc.). Participants were instructed to
rate the clarity of each spoken word on a scale from 1 (Not clear)
to 8 (Very clear). To prompt participants to respond, a response
cue consisting of a visual display of the rating scale was presented
1,200 ms after the onset of the spoken word (see Figure 2).
Participants used a keyboard to record their response and had no
time limit to do so. Subsequent trials began 1,000 ms after partic-
ipants entered their responses. Prior to the experiment, participants
completed a practice session of 30 trials containing all conditions
but using a different set of words to those used in the main
experiment.
Results
Ratings of perceived clarity are shown in Figure 3. As expected,
a repeated measures ANOVA revealed that increasing sensory
detail significantly enhanced clarity ratings (F(4,72)  277, MS 
494, p2  .939, p  .001). The congruency of written text also
enhanced clarity ratings (F(2,36)  43.8, MS  23.2, p2  .709,
p  .001). Critically, there was a significant interaction between
the congruency and timing of written text (F(8,144)  6.78, MS 
1.37, p2  .274, p .001), indicating that the effect of written text
on clarity ratings was most apparent when written text appeared
before speech onset.
To further characterize the influence of written text on clarity
ratings, we performed planned contrasts testing for positive effects
of matching text and negative effects of mismatching text on
clarity relative to neutral text ( clarity). As can be seen in Figure
4, matching text significantly enhanced clarity ratings compared
with neutral text (F(1,18)  52.9, MS 26.3, p2  .746, p .001).
There was also a significant interaction between written text con-
gruency (matching/neutral) and the amount of speech sensory
detail (F(4,72)  5.89, MS  .859, p2  .246, p  .001). We
determined the nature of this interaction by conducting a trend
analysis on the difference between matching and neutral ratings in
the before condition only (i.e., when the effect of written text was
most apparent). There was a significant quadratic trend (F(1,18) 
14.7, MS 4.18, p2  .450, p .01), indicating that the influence
of matching text on clarity ratings was most pronounced for speech
with an intermediate amount of sensory detail.
Whereas matching text enhanced clarity ratings, mismatching
text significantly reduced clarity ratings relative to neutral text
(F(1,18)  7.89, MS  1.76, p2  .305, p  .05). This reduction
effect was also dependent on the amount of speech sensory detail
as there was a significant interaction between written text congru-
ency (mismatching/neutral) and the amount of speech sensory
detail (F(4,72) 4.06, MS .843, p2  .184, p .01). As with our
previous analysis for matching text, we conducted a trend analysis
on the difference between mismatching and neutral ratings in the
before condition to examine how the influence of mismatching text
varied with sensory detail. In contrast to matching text, there was
a significant linear (and not quadratic) trend (F(1,18)  7.90, MS
4.78, p2  .305, p  .05), suggesting that the reduction of clarity
ratings in response to mismatching text varied in a monotonically
increasing manner for speech with a greater amount of sensory
detail.
A final analysis examined whether the influence of written text
on clarity ratings was apparent for the extreme cases of 1 channel
speech (unintelligible without support from written text) and 16
channel speech (highly intelligible). As before, we restricted this
analysis to the before condition data. Clarity ratings were signif-
icantly greater in the matching relative to mismatching conditions
for both 1 channel (one-tailed t(18) 2.82, 2 .306, p .01) and
16 channel speech (one-tailed t(18)  5.74, 2  .647, p  .001).
This suggests that matching text can enhance ratings of speech
clarity over a wide range of conditions (i.e., for unintelligible as
well as intelligible speech) even though the extent of this enhance-
ment may differ depending on the amount of sensory detail present
(as shown by the congruency by sensory detail interaction). The
pattern was different for mismatching text; although there was a
significant reduction in clarity ratings in the mismatching relative
to neutral conditions for 16 channel speech (one-tailed t(18) 
2.04, 2  .188, p  .05), there was no significant reduction for
1 channel speech (one-tailed t(18)  .938, p  .18). This pattern
was confirmed by a significant interaction between congruency
(mismatching/neutral) and sensory detail (1/16 channels)
(F(1,18)  4.59, MS  1.13, p2  .203, p  .05). One explanation
for the absence of an effect of mismatching text for 1 channel
Figure 3. Rated speech clarity in Experiment 1. The provision of increas-
ing sensory detail and prior knowledge from matching text both led to an
enhancement in rated speech clarity. The effect of matching text was most
pronounced when text appeared before speech onset. Error bars represent
SEM across participants corrected for between-participants variability (see
Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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speech is that clarity ratings were at floor for this amount of
sensory detail and therefore could not be reduced further by
mismatching text.
Discussion
The results from Experiment 1 demonstrate that prior knowl-
edge of speech content from written text has a measurable effect
on the rated clarity of vocoded speech, which replicates previous
findings from studies that used a similar paradigm to the one
employed here (Goldinger et al., 1999; Jacoby et al., 1988; So-
hoglu et al., 2012; Wild et al., 2012).
Our results also suggest that prior knowledge can have both
facilitatory and inhibitory effects on speech clarity ratings. Rela-
tive to the neutral condition in which prior knowledge of speech
content was absent, matching text enhanced clarity ratings,
whereas mismatching text reduced ratings. Although the magni-
tude of these effects varied with the amount of speech sensory
detail, a striking finding is that facilitatory effects of written text
occurred across the entire range of sensory detail tested (i.e., from
entirely unintelligible 1 channel speech to completely intelligible
16 channel speech). This finding is consistent with the study of
Frost et al. (1988), who reported that listeners are able to detect
correspondence between text and speech even when speech is
presented as signal correlated noise (containing only the temporal
envelope of speech, i.e., similar to the 1 channel condition here).
Such findings indicate that prior knowledge can influence percep-
tion with only a minimal amount of sensory information. None-
theless, for prior knowledge to have adaptive value, its influence
must be restricted to auditory signals that contain some speech
information to minimize the occurrence of misperceptions. Indeed,
Frost et al. also demonstrated that the influence of written text does
not extend to white noise that completely lacks speech envelope
information.
Finally, the most revealing result for existing accounts of speech
perception is our observation that the effects of written text on the
rated clarity of vocoded speech were less pronounced when written
text was presented 800 ms after speech onset compared to when it
was presented 800 ms before speech onset. This finding is readily
predicted by a top-down account whereby abstract (lexical or
phonological) knowledge obtained from written text modifies
lower-level acoustic representations of speech. An important pre-
diction of the model is that for prior knowledge to be effective in
modifying speech perception, acoustic representations of speech
must persist long enough to permit direct interaction with lexical
or phonological representations from written text. Because the
majority of the spoken words in Experiment 1 had a duration of
600 ms and because previous findings indicate that auditory
echoic memory has a limited duration of around 200–300 ms
(Cowan, 1984; Loveless et al., 1996; Massaro, 1970, 1974), acous-
tic representations of speech would have mostly decayed in the
condition when text was presented 800 ms after speech onset. As
a result, written text would have been less effective in modifying
speech clarity. In contrast, it is less obvious how a purely
bottom-up account would explain this finding. In such an account,
prior knowledge and sensory information are combined at a late
decision stage where information has been abstracted from audi-
tory and visual inputs and where information is easily maintained
over the period that was required here.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we sought further evidence that written text
influences the rated clarity of vocoded words by modifying audi-
tory echoic traces of speech. As noted above, previous work has
estimated the duration of auditory echoic memory to be around
200–300 ms. We therefore manipulated the timing of written text
in a finer-grained manner in order to determine whether the dura-
tion of auditory echoic memory is precisely reflected in the time-
course of prior knowledge effects. Speech was presented with
matching or mismatching text only as this comparison yielded the
largest effect of prior knowledge in Experiment 1. The stimulus
onset asynchrony (SOA) between written text and speech was
varied gradually from 1,600 ms (text before speech onset) to
1,600 ms (text after speech onset) to sample the underlying
timecourse of clarity enhancement by prior knowledge.
If the duration of echoic memory is reflected in the timecourse
relating clarity enhancement to SOA, two predictions follow. First,
in conditions when text is presented before speech onset (negative
SOAs), the influence of written text should be maximal and not
vary with SOA. This is because in these conditions, abstract lexical
or phonological representations from text will be able to modulate
acoustic input immediately upon speech arrival and therefore without
being constrained by echoic memory decay. Second, in conditions
when text is presented after speech onset (positive SOAs), the
influence of written text should start to decay only for SOAs
longer than 200–300 ms (after echoic memory decay). Note the
assumption here is that echoic memory stores acoustic information
corresponding to sublexical portions of speech. This is necessarily
the case as the 200–300 ms duration of echoic memory is shorter
than the typical 600 ms duration of monosyllabic words em-
ployed in the current study.
Materials and Method
Participants. Fourteen participants were tested after being
informed of the study’s procedure, which was approved by the
Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee. All were na-
tive speakers of English, aged between 18 and 40 years and
reported no history of hearing impairment or neurological disease.
Figure 4. Rated speech clarity in Experiment 1 relative to the neutral
condition ( clarity). Whereas matching text enhanced speech clarity,
mismatching text reduced clarity. Light horizontal gray lines represent no
difference in clarity from neutral condition (i.e., zero  clarity). Error bars
represent SEM across participants corrected for between-participants vari-
ability (see Loftus & Masson, 1994). M  Matching; MM  MisMatch-
ing; N  Neutral.
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Stimuli and procedure. The stimuli were similar to those of
Experiment 1. A total of 396 monosyllabic words were presented
in spoken or written format. The spoken words were 16-bit, 44.1
kHz recordings of the same male speaker for Experiment 1, and
their duration ranged from 317 to 902 ms (M  598 ms, SD  81
ms).
Speech was presented with either matching or mismatching text
and with 2, 4, or 8 channels of sensory detail. The SOA between
speech and written text included the following values (with neg-
ative SOAs indicating that text was presented before speech on-
set): 1,600 ms, 800 ms, 400 ms, 200 ms, 100 ms, 0 ms,
100 ms, 200 ms, 400 ms, 800 ms or 1,600 ms. After a
fixed time interval of 2,000 ms relative to the onset of each spoken
word, participants were prompted to give their rating of speech
clarity. This meant that the period between the onset of written text
and presentation of the response cue varied depending on the
particular SOA condition. However, in all cases the response cue
came after the written text. As in Experiment 1, participants had no
time limit with which to give their responses.
Manipulations of congruency (matching/mismatching), speech
sensory detail (2/4/8 channels) and SOA were fully crossed, re-
sulting in a 2  3  11 factorial design with six trials in each
condition. Trials were randomly ordered during each of four pre-
sentation blocks of 198 trials. For each participant, each of the
spoken words appeared twice: once as a matching trial and once as
a mismatching trial. The first presentation of each word occurred
in the first two blocks of the experiment and the second presen-
tation occurred in the final two blocks. The particular words
assigned to each condition were randomized over participants.
Prior to the experiment, participants completed a practice ses-
sion of 12 trials containing all written text congruency and speech
sensory detail conditions presented with SOAs of 800, 100,
100 and 800 ms. For this practice session, a different set of
words was used to those in the main experiment. All other details
of the stimuli and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1.
Results
In order to assess the effect of SOA on ratings of perceived
clarity, we conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA on the differ-
ence in clarity ratings between speech with matching and mis-
matching text ( clarity), as shown in Figure 5. In addition, we
recoded negative and positive SOAs as two separate conditions
(before/after) so that factors of written text timing (before/after)
and SOA (100/200/400/800/1,600 ms) could be specified. Note
that as a result, the 0 ms condition was not included in the
ANOVA.
As expected from the findings of Experiment 1,  clarity was
significantly greater than zero (F(1,13)  22.3, MS  388, p2 
.632, p  .001) indicating that clarity ratings were enhanced for
matching relative to mismatching text. Furthermore, this enhance-
ment was most apparent when text was presented before speech
onset (F(1,13)  14.0, MS  8.47, p2  .519, p  .01). Critically,
there was a significant two-way interaction between written text
timing (before/after) and SOA (F(4,52)  3.99, MS  2.23, p2 
.235, p  .01). Visual inspection of the means suggests that this
interaction arose because  clarity remained stable with varying
SOA when text was presented before speech onset but declined
with increasing SOA when text appeared after speech onset. This
pattern was confirmed by testing for simple effects of SOA on 
clarity. These tests revealed no significant effect of SOA on 
clarity when text was presented before speech onset (F  1).
Instead, the effect of SOA was limited to conditions in which text
was presented after speech onset (F(4,52)  14.0, MS  3.35, p2 
.361, p  .001).
We next determined the SOA after which  clarity started to
decline, which we shall term the breakpoint. This problem can be
solved by modeling the data in an iterative fashion using a piece-
wise linear regression procedure (see Hudson, 1966). With this
method, the data are modeled as different submodels to reflect a
situation in which the relationship between two or more variables
(i.e., SOA and  clarity) changes at some critical value (i.e., the
breakpoint). That critical value is then adjusted until the least-
squares error (or other measure of model fit) is minimized. Using
this procedure, we fitted two submodels in which  clarity was
unaffected by SOA before the breakpoint and declined monoton-
ically thereafter, as follows:
breakpoint n1600: claritymn c
1600 n breakpoint: clarity yb
where n is the SOA; m and c represent the slope and intercept of
a linear-least squares function relating SOA to  clarity after the
Figure 5.  clarity (relative to the mismatching condition) in Experiment
2 as a function of SOA. Each data point represents  clarity for the 11 SOA
conditions; their x-axis locations can be interpreted as the latencies when
written text was presented (relative to speech onset, see top panel for an
example spoken word). Error bars represent SEM across participants
corrected for between-participants variability (see Loftus & Masson,
1994). The black dotted lines represent the breakpoint models given by the
mean best-fitting parameters across participants (see main text for details).
The vertical gray lines indicate the locations of the mean best-fitting
breakpoints.
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breakpoint; and yb is the value of  clarity predicted at/before the
breakpoint by this linear least squares function.
We determined the breakpoint that gave the best model fit by
systematically varying the breakpoint from 0 to400 ms and each
time computing the root mean square error (RMSE). This was
done separately for each sensory detail condition and participant.
The model given by the mean best-fitting parameters across par-
ticipants for each sensory detail condition is shown overlaid onto
Figure 5. The mean best-fitting breakpoint across sensory detail
conditions and participants was found to be 119 ms. To test
whether the breakpoint depended on speech sensory detail, the
best-fitting breakpoint for each participant and sensory detail con-
dition was entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA with sensory
detail as the within-subjects factor. As the amount of sensory detail
increased there was a significant decrease in the breakpoint
(F(2,26)  4.38, MS  58809, p2  .252, p  .05). A similar
analysis was performed for the other parameters of the model:
fitted  clarity at the breakpoint (quantifying the amount of 
clarity before it declined) and the best-fitting slope (quantifying
the rate of decline). Although the main effect of sensory detail on
 clarity at the breakpoint was not significant (F(2,26)  1.62,
MS .832, p2  .111, p .218), there was a significant quadratic
trend (F(1,13)  5.70, MS  11940, p2  .305, p  .05) indicating
that  clarity at the breakpoint was greatest for speech with an
intermediate amount (i.e., 4 channels) of sensory detail. Similarly for
the best-fitting slope, although the main effect of sensory detail was
marginally significant (F(2,26)  2.74, MS  6051, p2  .174, p 
.083), there was a significant quadratic trend (F(1,13)  5.70, MS 
11940, p2  .305, p  .05) suggesting that the slope was most
negative for speech with an intermediate amount of sensory detail.
A final analysis aimed at determining the impact of speech
duration on the enhancement of speech clarity by matching text. A
previous study (Hervais-Adelman, Davis, Johnsrude, & Carlyon,
2008) has shown that speech duration is a significant predictor of
vocoded speech intelligibility and hence might be expected to
influence the relationship between SOA and  clarity. Although
the spoken words employed in the current experiment were all
monosyllabic, they varied in their duration from 317 to 902 ms.
This allowed us to compare the bottom quartile of spoken words
that had a mean duration of 495 ms (SD  40) to the top quartile
that had a mean duration of 701 ms (SD  47). We fitted the same
breakpoint model described earlier to the data but no effect of
speech duration was found on any of the parameters ( clarity at
the breakpoint, slope and the breakpoint itself) of the best-fitting
model.
Discussion
In Experiment 2, we confirmed the two predictions of the
top-down account. We observed that the influence of written text
on speech clarity was maximal and did not vary with SOA when
presented before speech onset. It is only when text was presented
more than 120 ms after speech onset that its influence became
progressively less effective. At first glance this might appear to be
too early to be explained in terms of a transient auditory echoic
memory that lasts 200–300 ms. However, this assumes that
written text was immediately processed upon presentation, which
would not have been the case. Convergent evidence from masked
priming (Ferrand & Grainger, 1993; Rastle & Brysbaert, 2006) and
neurophysiological (Ashby, Sanders, & Kingston, 2009; Cornelis-
sen et al., 2009; Wheat, Cornelissen, Frost, & Hansen, 2010)
studies suggest that we are able to extract phonological informa-
tion from written text within 100 ms of text onset. With a lag of
100 ms, the current results suggest that written text was less
effective in enhancing speech perception when processed 220
ms after speech onset, well within the 200–300 ms range estimated
to be the duration of auditory echoic memory. Thus, Experiment 2
provides further evidence consistent with an account in which
prior knowledge from written text influences speech perception in
a top-down manner by modifying a transient acoustic representa-
tion of speech in echoic memory.
The other finding from Experiment 2 is that the SOA at which
the influence of written text on rated clarity started to decline (i.e.,
the breakpoint) decreased for speech that had greater sensory
detail. One possible interpretation of this result is that echoic
memory is a limited capacity system that decays more rapidly for
more complex acoustic information. This interpretation is specu-
lative, as we are not aware of any studies that have systematically
explored the relationship between acoustic complexity and the
duration of echoic memory. Furthermore, the visual analogue of
echoic memory (termed iconic memory) is widely believed to be a
transient but infinite capacity store (see Loftus, Duncan, & Gehrig,
1992). Hence, if these two forms of sensory memory possess
similar characteristics, echoic memory would not be expected to
depend on acoustic complexity. An alternative explanation for this
finding is the presence of a nonlinear mapping between speech
clarity and listeners’ ratings that would have distorted differences
in ratings across sensory detail conditions (see Poulton, 1979).
Experiment 3
In Experiments 1 and 2, we obtained evidence in support of a
top-down account of how prior knowledge influences the rated
clarity of vocoded speech. According to this account, abstract
linguistic information from written text modifies lower-level
acoustic processing of speech. In Experiment 3, we asked whether
this process is dependent on the lexical or phonological correspon-
dence between text and speech. To address this question, we
included an additional congruency condition in which written text
partially mismatched with speech by a single phonetic feature in a
single segment either at word onset or offset. If effects of prior
knowledge depend on perfect lexical correspondence between text
and speech, listeners should give this condition the same clarity
rating as speech presented with (fully) mismatching text. In con-
trast, if they depend on phonological correspondence then partial
mismatching speech should have an intermediate clarity between
matching and mismatching conditions.
In addition to listeners rating the clarity of speech, they were
also asked to decide on each trial whether text and speech con-
tained the same word or different words. This second measure
enabled us to examine whether the same perceptual effect of
written text on clarity ratings could be observed on trials when
speech was reported either as matching or mismatching with text.
Materials and Method
Participants. Nineteen participants were tested after being
informed of the study’s procedure, which was approved by the
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Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee. All were
native speakers of English, aged between 18 and 40 years and
reported no history of hearing impairment or neurological dis-
ease.
Stimuli and procedure. A total of 576 monosyllabic words
were presented in spoken or written format. The spoken words
were 16-bit, 44.1 kHz recordings of the same male speaker for
Experiments 1 and 2 and their duration ranged from 317 to 903 ms
(M  583, SD  77). These items consisted of 144 word pairs
selected from the CELEX database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gu-
likers, 1995) that mismatched either at their onset (e.g., pie/tie) or
offset (e.g., lisp/list) segments. Mismatched segments differed in
one phonetic dimension only (place of articulation) and included
the following pairs: [p] versus [t], [p] versus [k], [t] versus [k], [b]
versus [d], [b] versus [g], [d] versus [g], [f] versus [s], [	] versus
[s], and [m] versus [n]. Each word in a pair was randomly assigned
to be presented in written or spoken form. Partial mismatching
items were obtained directly from these word pairs while matching
items were created by randomly selecting one word in a pair and
presenting that word in both written and spoken form. Mismatch-
ing items were created by randomly shuffling the wordlists for the
item pairs.
Matching, partial mismatching or mismatching text was pre-
sented 800 ms before the onset of speech. Speech was presented
with 2, 4, or 8 channels of sensory detail. Manipulations of
congruency (matching/partial mismatching/mismatching) and
speech sensory detail (2/4/8 channels) were fully crossed re-
sulting in a 3  3 factorial design. We additionally included a
factor of item type (onset/offset) to assess the effect of whether
partial mismatches occurred at the onset or offset of syllables.
Although this comparison was confounded by item differences,
any overall difference in speech clarity between onset and
offset items should be subtracted out when testing for an
interaction between item type and congruency. Furthermore, we
would not expect differences between matching and (fully)
mismatching trials as a function of onset versus offset. There
were 32 trials in each condition that were randomly ordered
during each of four presentation blocks of 144 trials. Within
each group of onset and offset items, the particular words
assigned to each sensory detail and congruency condition were
randomized over participants.
Participants were instructed to perform two tasks. As in Exper-
iment 1, participants were prompted 1,200 ms after the onset of
each spoken word to rate the clarity of speech on a scale from 1 to
8. Following their response for this clarity rating task, participants
were prompted to decide if the spoken word was the same or
different to the prior written word. Participants used a keyboard to
record their responses for both tasks and had no time limit to do so.
Subsequent trials began 1,000 ms after participants entered their
responses. Prior to the experiment, participants completed a prac-
tice session of 24 trials containing all conditions but using a
different set of words to those used in the main experiment. All
other details of the stimuli and procedure were the same as in
Experiment 1.
Results
We first analyzed ratings of perceived clarity in each condition,
as shown in Figure 6. We tested whether the partial mismatching
condition was rated as being intermediate in clarity between
matching and mismatching conditions by conducting two
ANOVAs: one that tested for a difference between partial mis-
matching and matching conditions and one that tested for a dif-
ference between partial mismatching and mismatching conditions.
For each ANOVA, the factors were congruency, sensory detail
(2/4/8 channels) and item type (onset/offset).
Partial mismatching speech was rated as being significantly
reduced in clarity relative to the matching condition (F(1,18) 150,
MS 10.3, p2 .893, p .001) but significantly greater in clarity
relative to the mismatching condition (F(1,18)  45.9, MS  14.6,
p2 .718, p .001). Hence, partial mismatching speech was rated
as being intermediate in clarity between matching and mismatch-
ing conditions. For each comparison, there was a significant in-
teraction between congruency and sensory detail (partial mis-
matching/matching: F(2,36)  30.8, MS  2.15, p2  .631, p 
.001; partial mismatching/mismatching: F(2,36)  13.9, MS 
1.17, p2  .435, p  .001). Visual inspection of the means in
Figure 6 suggests that this interaction arose because the interme-
diate clarity profile of partial mismatching speech became more
apparent with an increasing amount of sensory detail. For 2 chan-
nel speech that had the least amount of sensory detail, there was no
Figure 6. Rated speech clarity in Experiment 3. Speech that was partial
mismatching with prior text was rated as being intermediate in clarity
between matching and (fully) mismatching speech. Error bars represent
SEM across participants corrected for between-participants variability (see
Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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significant difference in clarity ratings between partial mismatch-
ing and matching speech (F(1,18)  1.16, MS  .088, p2  .061,
p .295). This absence of a difference suggests that listeners were
misreporting these items as completely matching (an interpretation
consistent with our analysis of the same/different task described
below). There was, however, a significant difference in clarity
ratings between partial mismatching and mismatching conditions
for 2 channel speech (F(1,18)  52.4, MS  8.26, p2  .745, p 
.001), suggesting that listeners were able to detect more extensive
mismatches between text and 2 channel speech. All of the above
effects were also significant when considering onset and offset
items separately.
We next asked whether clarity ratings for the partial mismatch-
ing condition depended on whether partial mismatches occurred at
the onset or offset of syllables by testing for an interaction between
congruency and item type (onset/offset). As mentioned previously,
any overall difference in clarity ratings between onset and offset
items should cancel out when assessing this interaction. To check
that this was the case, we began by including only matching and
mismatching conditions in the repeated measures ANOVA. Since
these conditions were identical apart from the item lists from
which they were drawn, the interaction between congruency and
item type should be nonsignificant. However, the interaction was
significant (F(1,18)  102, MS  49.4, p2  .850, p  .001),
thereby preventing us from further assessing the impact of syllable
position on perception of partial mismatching speech.2 Visual
inspection of the means revealed that this interaction arose from a
reduction in the difference between matching and mismatching
conditions for offset items. As a possible explanation for this
unforeseen result, we note that offset items were rated as having
significantly greater clarity than onset items (F(1,18)  99.7, MS 
9.56, p2  .847, p  .001). As previously shown in Experiment 1,
the effect of written text on clarity ratings depends on the inherent
intelligibility of the speech signal. If this inherent intelligibility
changes, whether from increased speech sensory detail, or in the
current context, from acoustic or linguistic properties of the items
themselves, the effect of written text on clarity ratings will also
change. Hence, for previous and subsequent analyses, we do not
compare onset and offset conditions directly. To ensure that the
remaining (congruency and sensory detail) effects were present for
both types of item, we report the results from ANOVAs that
average over onset and offset items and also from separate
ANOVAs on each item type (unless stated otherwise).
We next analyzed listeners’ responses in the same/different task
by computing the proportion of trials in which listeners responded
with the “same” judgment and hence reported speech as matching
with text. As with our previous ratings analysis, the data were
entered into two separate ANOVAs that compared partial mis-
matching with matching and with mismatching contexts (again
including factors of sensory detail and item type). As shown in
Figure 7, the proportion of “same” responses made for the partial
mismatching condition was significantly lower than the matching
condition (F(1,18)  169, MS  4.46, p2  .904, p  .001) but
significantly higher than the mismatching condition (F(1,18) 330,
MS  12.3, p2  .948, p  .001). This pattern parallels the clarity
profile obtained earlier and indicates that the proportion of “same”
responses closely followed the amount of phonological correspon-
dence between text and speech. There was also a significant
interaction between congruency and sensory detail for each com-
parison (partial mismatching vs. matching: F(2,36)  63.7, MS 
.425, p2  .780, p  .001; partial mismatching vs. mismatching:
F(2,36)  7.97, MS  .054, p2  .307, p  .001), indicating that
listeners’ accuracy in detecting the correspondence between text
and speech improved with increasing amount of sensory detail
(i.e., they made more “same” responses in the matching condition
and fewer “same” responses in the partial mismatching and mis-
matching conditions). For 2 channel speech that had the least
amount of sensory detail, the proportion of “same” responses for
the partial mismatching condition (averaged over onset and offset
items) was significantly above the value of 0.5 that would be
expected by chance in the absence of a response bias (two-tailed
t(18)  2.23, 2  .216, p  .05). The proportion of “same”
responses was also significantly above chance for 4 channel
speech (two-tailed t(18)  3.91, 2  .459, p  .001) but not for
2 We also conducted a linear-mixed effects analysis (Baayen, Davidson,
& Bates, 2008) to determine whether this interaction between congruency
(matching/mismatching) and item type (onset/offset) would also be signif-
icant when taking into account variability in clarity responses attributable
to items. Participants and items were entered as random effects, and
congruency, sensory detail, and item type (and their interactions) as fixed
effects. The interaction was also found to be significant with this analysis
suggesting it was general to the population of items tested.
Figure 7. Proportion of responses in which participants in Experiment 3
reported speech and text to contain the same or different words. The
proportion of “same” responses to speech that was partial mismatching
with prior text was intermediate between matching and (fully) mismatching
speech. Error bars represent SEM across participants corrected for
between-participants variability (see Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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8 channel speech (two-tailed t(18)  .158, 2  .001, p  .876).
This suggests that for the 2 channel and 4 channel conditions, not
only were listeners unable to detect partial mismatches between
text and speech but also were systematically misreporting these
items as completely matching. All of the above effects were also
significant when considering onset and offset items separately.
Our final analysis established whether the intermediate clarity
profile of partial mismatching speech was apparent on the basis of
single trials conditioned according to whether listeners reported speech
and text to contain the same or different words. This would rule out
the possibility that the intermediate clarity profile emerged as a
result of averaging across trials: listeners could have reported
partial mismatching speech as completely matching (and therefore
very clear) on some trials and completely mismatching (and there-
fore very unclear) on other trials. Hence, for the following analy-
sis, listeners’ judgments of speech clarity were classified according
to their responses in the same/different task so that an additional
factor of response type (same/different) could be included in
repeated measures ANOVA. Only the 4 channel speech conditions
were analyzed, as these were the conditions in which the interme-
diate clarity profile was most apparent and performance in the
same/different task was significantly different from chance. Fur-
thermore, the data were averaged over onset and offset conditions
to ensure a sufficient number of trials in each condition. Partici-
pants who made fewer than three responses in any condition were
excluded from this analysis, leaving 16 participants in the resulting
dataset. As with our previous analysis, separate ANOVAs were
conducted to compare partial mismatching with matching and
mismatching conditions.
Figure 8 presents mean clarity ratings for each condition in
this new analysis that included the factor of response type
(same/different). For trials in which listeners responded with
the “same” judgment, the partial mismatching condition dif-
fered in clarity from both matching (one-tailed t(15)  8.52,
2  .829, p  .001) and mismatching (one-tailed t(15)  4.14,
2  .829, p  .001) conditions. Hence, fine-grained differ-
ences in listeners’ subjective experience appear to be present
even when there are no differences in their final objective
report. For “different” trials the pattern changed since although
there was a marginally significant difference in clarity ratings
between partial mismatching and mismatching conditions (one-
tailed t(15)  1.36, 2  .829, p  .097), there was no
significant difference between partial mismatching and match-
ing conditions (one-tailed t(15)  .062, 2  .829, p  .476).
However, this changed pattern for “different” trials was not
supported by a significant interaction between congruency (par-
tial mismatching/matching) and response type (same/different)
(F(1,15)  1.91, MS  .770, p2  .113, p  .187). In summary,
this analysis confirms that the intermediate clarity profile ob-
served previously on the basis of clarity ratings alone was also
present on trials in which speech was always reported as match-
ing with text and hence cannot be attributed to averaging ratings
across trials.
Discussion
In Experiment 3, we have demonstrated that the magnitude of
written text influence on speech clarity varies monotonically with
the amount of phonological correspondence between text and
speech; the clarity rating obtained for speech presented after partial
mismatching text was intermediate between that of matching and
mismatching conditions. Thus, effects of written text depend on
the phonological (and not lexical) correspondence between text
and speech. This phonological interaction between text and speech
may arise directly, at a phonological level of processing, or indi-
rectly, between lexical units of representation that share compo-
nent segments (see Luce & Pisoni, 1998).
The above pattern was also present on trials in which speech
was always reported as matching with text and, hence, cannot be
an effect attributable to averaging clarity ratings across trials in the
matching and mismatching conditions. For that analysis, one might
ask why there should have been any differences in clarity given
that speech was always reported as matching with text? One
possibility is that such differences in subjective experience reflect
listeners’ certainty as to the correspondence between text and
speech. This result illustrates the utility of using the subjective
measure of clarity to probe speech perception as it reveals fine-
grained differences in listeners’ subjective experience despite the
absence of differences in their final objective report.
Another finding from Experiment 3 that deserves comment is
that listeners were systematically responding with the “same”
judgment when text partially mismatched with 2 channel and 4
channel speech. This indicates that the level of speech degradation
in these conditions was high enough that prior knowledge from
written text resulted in listeners misreporting speech as having
matched with text. This finding is consistent with a number of
previous studies showing that prior knowledge can sometimes
have inhibitory effects on perception (Król & El-Deredy, 2011;
Samuel, 1981). For example, Samuel (1981) presented listeners
with spoken words in which one of the constituent phonemes was
replaced by noise; a condition known to result in listeners hearing
Figure 8. Rated speech clarity in Experiment 3, conditioned on whether
participants reported speech and text to contain the same word or different
words. The intermediate clarity profile observed previously (i.e., when
collapsing across “same” and “different” judgments, as in Figure 6) is also
obtained when considering only “same” trials (and hence cannot be attrib-
uted to averaging across “same” and “different” trials; see main text for
details). Error bars represent SEM across participants corrected for
between-participants variability (see Loftus & Masson, 1994).
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the missing speech sound (the phoneme restoration effect, Warren,
1970). In another condition, the phoneme was intact but had noise
added to it. Samuel used signal detection theory to show that
listeners’ sensitivity to perceptual differences between these two
conditions was worse in lexical contexts that strongly supported
the presence of the phoneme (e.g., in words rather than nonwords).
Hence, it appears that lexical knowledge in this case was unhelpful
to performance on the task as it resulted in both conditions ap-
pearing to contain noisy phonemes. Here we have shown that
strong but misleading prior knowledge can result in listeners
misreporting the correspondence between spoken and written
words.
General Discussion
Prior knowledge is an important source of information that
listeners exploit during perception of degraded speech. Across a
series of three experiments, we investigated how prior knowledge
from written text alters the rated clarity of vocoded spoken words.
We now provide further discussion of the results in relation to
existing accounts of speech perception and to previous research
that has investigated the perception of vocoded speech.
A key finding from the current research is that the effects of
prior knowledge were critically dependent on the precise timing of
prior knowledge from written text and speech onset. Over the
course of Experiments 1 and 2, we showed that written text was
progressively less effective in modifying speech clarity when text
was presented more than 120 ms after speech onset. As dis-
cussed previously, this result suggests that integration of prior
knowledge and sensory information occurs “online” as listeners
hear speech and is well explained by a top-down account (e.g.,
TRACE; McClelland & Elman, 1986) in which abstract linguistic
information from written text is used to modify a transient echoic
memory trace of acoustic information from speech that lasts for
around 200–300 ms.
In contrast to the top-down account above, a strictly bottom-up
mechanism (e.g., Merge; Norris et al., 2000) should not have been
time-limited by the duration of echoic memory because the critical
computations in such an account occur at a later decision stage of
processing where representations have been abstracted from sen-
sory inputs and hence can be maintained in working memory over
a period of several seconds without decay. One might argue that
our timing manipulation could have affected the decision mecha-
nism in other ways. For instance, listeners could have given less
weight to later arriving information, leading to lower clarity ratings
when higher-level knowledge from written text was available after
speech onset (see Kiani, Hanks & Shadlen, 2008). However, recent
evidence suggests that such biases are not reliable across the
population when participants are not time-pressured to make their
responses (Tsetsos, Gao, McClelland, & Usher, 2012), as was the
case in the current study. Furthermore, the top-down account is
also consistent with evidence from recent neuroimaging studies
employing a similar paradigm to the current study (discussed
below). Therefore, the top-down account remains our favored
explanation of the present data.
Similar timing effects to those observed here have previously
been reported for written word recognition. Rumelhart and
McClelland (1982) showed that forced choice accuracy of letter
recognition was reduced when the surrounding word context was
visible after (rather than before) presentation of the target letter. In
the current study we have argued that such timing effects, in
conjunction with consideration of the temporal extent of acoustic
and higher-level representations of spoken words, successfully
distinguish between top-down and bottom-up accounts of speech
perception.
The top-down account we have proposed is also consistent with
recent findings from studies that have tracked neural activity
during perception of vocoded speech with fMRI (Wild et al., 2012)
and neurophysiological recordings (EEG/MEG) (Sohoglu et al.,
2012). Both studies observed changes in activity in regions of
auditory cortex when prior matching text enhanced speech clarity.
In the fMRI study by Wild et al., these changes in activity were
observed to occur in the most primary region of auditory cortex,
suggesting the involvement of a low-level acoustic stage of pro-
cessing that would be expected to display the characteristics of an
echoic memory trace. In addition to activity changes in auditory
cortex, these neuroimaging studies also reported changes in pre-
frontal regions that have been associated with higher-order pho-
nological processing (Booth et al., 2002; Burton, 2001; Hickok &
Poeppel, 2007; Price, 2000; Wheat et al., 2010). Furthermore, in
the EEG/MEG study of Sohoglu et al., activity changes in these
prefrontal regions were observed to occur prior to changes in
lower-level auditory regions. This timing profile is uniquely con-
sistent with a top-down mechanism.
Our account of the current data is reminiscent of proposals that
perception is initially stimulus driven and involves a bottom-up
sweep of information through a processing hierarchy that main-
tains a form of transient sensory memory for a limited period
(Lamme, 2003; Zylberberg, Dehaene, Mindlin, & Sigman, 2009).
According to these accounts, a second phase of top-down process-
ing that originates in higher-order stages of the hierarchy subse-
quently acts to select and maintain a subset of information from
this sensory trace for further processing. For stimuli that are
degraded and that do not provide immediate access to higher-order
representations (such as phonemes or words), this top-down sweep
of processing is primarily guided by a second source of informa-
tion (such as written text). On the basis of the current results, we
propose that it is the ensuing recurrent interactions between acous-
tic and higher-order linguistic representations of speech that un-
derlie the influence of prior knowledge observed here.
Differing Forms of Top-Down Processing: Interactive
or Predictive?
If a top-down mechanism best accounts for the current data,
what precise form does this top-down processing take? We have
argued elsewhere on the basis of MEG and EEG findings (Sohoglu
et al., 2012) that one influential top-down model of speech per-
ception, TRACE, may not in fact implement the type of top-down
processing shown during perception of vocoded speech. This is
because TRACE is an interactive-activation model with bidirec-
tional excitatory connections between stages of processing that
increase activation of model units in those stages. Such organiza-
tion would lead to equivalent effects on acoustic-phonetic process-
ing in response to increased sensory detail and the provision of
higher-level knowledge from matching text. However, we ob-
served opposite effects of these two manipulations on the magni-
tude of neural responses in auditory cortex (Sohoglu et al., 2012).
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We suggested that the form of top-down processing that can
account for this result is instead implemented by a class of com-
putational model known as predictive coding (Arnal & Giraud,
2012; Friston, 2010; Gagnepain, Henson, & Davis, 2012; Rao &
Ballard, 1999). This account employs a form of Bayesian hierar-
chical inference in which the role of top-down information is to
predict the activity at lower levels in the hierarchy. During per-
ception, these top-down predictions are adjusted so that they come
to match (as closely as possible) the lower-level activity they seek
to predict, thereby minimizing prediction error. Accordingly, lis-
tening conditions in which top-down predictions explain a larger
portion of sensory activity (such as when speech follows matching
text) should result in less error and a reduction in activity, as was
observed in auditory cortex. In contrast, when the amount of
sensory detail is increased in the absence of any prediction for that
sensory information, neural responses should increase, which is
again what we observed in auditory cortex. Thus, one possibility is
that the provision of lexical or phonological knowledge enables
more accurate prediction of lower-level acoustic-phonetic repre-
sentations of speech. Regardless of the precise nature of the
underlying top-down process (i.e., interactive or predictive), what
is clear is that a top-down mechanism of some kind appears to best
explain the available evidence to date.
Relationship to Previous Research Investigating
Perception of Vocoded Speech
The majority of research that has investigated the perception of
vocoded speech has focused on the acoustic factors affecting its
intelligibility (e.g., Deeks & Carlyon, 2004; Loizou et al., 1999;
Roberts et al., 2011; Rosen et al., 1999; Whitmal et al., 2007; Xu
et al., 2005). Relatively few studies have explored the role of
higher-level cognitive factors, which has been the approach taken
here (e.g., Davis, Johnsrude, Hervais-Adelman, Taylor, & McGet-
tigan, 2005; Stacey & Summerfield, 2007; Sheldon et al., 2008b;
Loebach, Pisoni, & Svirsky, 2010). Of these latter studies, partic-
ular attention has been paid to how comprehension (e.g., as as-
sessed by word report accuracy) improves over the course of
exposure. This improvement in speech comprehension is a form of
perceptual learning and contrasts with the more immediate aspects
of perception studied here. Perceptual learning is likely to be
critically important for postlingually deafened cochlear implant
users who have to adapt to the novel sounds delivered by their
implant after the device is first switched on or whenever adjusted
to test new processing strategies (Moore & Shannon, 2009).
Of particular relevance to the current study is the demonstration
that providing listeners with knowledge of speech content en-
hances the rate of learning of vocoded speech (Davis et al., 2005).
Other characteristics of learning are shared with the phenomenon
studied here. The provision of higher-level knowledge has maxi-
mal effect on the rate of learning when provided before (rather
than after) speech presentation (Hervais-Adelman et al., 2008).
Furthermore, the effect of learning is to alter representations of
speech that have not been completely abstracted from the acoustic
input (e.g., acoustic-phonetic or allophonic representations)
(Dahan & Mead, 2010; Hervais-Adelman, Davis, Johnsrude, Tay-
lor, & Carlyon, 2011). These findings suggests that the top-down
effects of prior knowledge on immediate perception observed here
may also contribute to longer-term perceptual learning (for a
similar proposal in the context of lexically guided perception of
ambiguous phonemes, see Mirman, McClelland, & Holt, 2006).
Future investigations are needed to confirm this hypothesis and
rule out the possibility that effects of prior knowledge on percep-
tion and learning occur via separate mechanisms, as has also been
proposed (Norris, McQueen, & Cutler, 2003).
Conclusion
In the three experiments reported here, we have demonstrated
that prior knowledge from written text has a powerful influence on
the perception of vocoded speech that is comparable to the effect
of changing the physical characteristics of the speech signal.
Although written text need not precisely match speech for this
influence to occur, it must be presented no later than 120 ms
after speech onset for maximum effect. These findings suggest that
the effects of prior knowledge investigated here arise from top-
down modulation of auditory processing for degraded speech.
They further suggest a critical role for the timing of top-down and
sensory inputs that imposes limits on the conditions that allow
transient acoustic information to be successfully modulated by
higher-level knowledge.
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